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STATEMENT^, OF FACTS 
William Silas Case was convictedr in the Third Judicial 
District Court/ County of Tooelef State of Utah, of the offense 
of Aggravated Assault/ a felony of the third degree. 
At his trial/ the alleged victim/ Suzzanne McPerrsonf did 
not appear. The Court determined that she was unavailable and 
permitted the use of her taped testimony from the preliminary 
hearing to be introduced at trial. 
In the early hours of February 6/ 1986f the defendant and 
Ms. McPerrsonf were in his motel room at a truck stop in 
Lakepoint Utah. Screams were heard from the motel room followed 
by the defendant informing the motel manager that there was a 
"crazy women" in his room and that the police should be 
contacted. 
Ms. McPerrson appeared in the managers office bleeding from 
cuts. The alleged victim maintained that the defendant had tried 
to kill her. The defendant maintained that the alleged victim 
was attempting suicide and the struggle in the motel room was a 
result of his attempt to prevent her self destruction. 
'*•-. McForrson wat e^ yw&r< - ^ ubp<^r ;•- v, le c;he *J ^ t : -
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Point ,1 
THE U'lA* •, . , 1 rr/i: r t^'JN1 f. -iM ; THAT THE STATE'S 
WITNESS WA£ NOT UNAVAILABLE AAF NOT IN CONFLICT WITH THIS 
COURT'S DECISIOf , " ?TA!H- < '!MPv/N 
This 7o :r* determined in State,,yy..Chapman/ *- — *•- • * 
(Utah, 120^; LIIOL, "testimony ol ~~ unavailable witness j; - r at 
~> _ 
a preliminary hearing can be used at trial provided prosecutorial 
authorities have made a good faith effort to obtain his presence 
at trial." Chapman supra at Pg.1122. 
In that case there were two witnesses, who did not appear at 
trial and whose testimony at preliminary hearing was used after a 
finding of unavailability. This Court recognized that the 
majority rule required the mandatory use of the Uniform. Act, to 
Sgcure^the. Attendance, pf. Witpess.es_f rpm. Wifchout.„the^State^in 
Criminal. Proceedings/ Title 77, Chapter 21, Section 1 g£. seg, 
Utah^gQde Annotated (1953 as amended) finding thatf "we cannot 
affirm the admission of preliminary hearing testimony where the 
party's efforts to secure the witnesss1 attendance are cursory, 
where the party had clear indications that the witness would not 
attend or where the party had obvious means of obtaining those 
indications but neglected to do so." ghapmap supra at Pg.1122. 
In the CftaBjnap decision, the testimony of Donald Kearney 
could not be substituted by his taped testimony. However, the 
Court determined the second witness, Richard Scoville, was 
unavailable and the prosecutor had made reasonable and good faith 
efforts to secure his attendance. 
The facts of the case show that Mr. Scoville was mailed a 
subpoena which he acknowledged by affixing his signature to that 
document. Every indication was that Mr. Scoville would appear 
for trial until he informed the county attorney that his employer 
would not allow his attendance. The prosecutor then attempted to 
contact Scovilles employer, but was unsuccessful. This, 
apparently, left five days before trial to implement the Uniform^ 
Act. It also appeared that Mr. Scoville's testimony was more 
cumulative than crucial in the State's presentation of the case. 
It was Mr. Kearney who provided the more crucial facts in a case 
that had other witnesses to the offense. 
This court recognized, in the Chapman case, that the 
determination of unavailability was a matter of case by case 
analysis. The circumstances of the ghapman case lead to the 
conclusion that witness Kearney was not unavailable although his 
testimony had sufficient indicia of reliability to permit its 
introduction. Witness Scoville was unavailable because there was 
sufficient compliance with this Court's two pronged test of 
unavailability. 
The Court of Appeals, in rendering its decision in the 
William Silas Case matter, gtatg^ y^ > _Sas.fi, 55 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
P.63, (Ct. App. 1987), analyzed the matter in relation to this 
Court's decision in gfrapmap. There were four facts upon which 
the Court of Appeals determined that the witness was not 
unavailable. 
First, although McPerrson had been mailed a subpoena and 
acknowledged the same by telephone, there was no formal 
acknowledgement. Scoville, in the Chapman case had returned a 
signed copy. 
— C — 
Secondly, the witness McPerrson was a very crucial witness. 
The Court Appeals acknowledged, 
"Defendant could only be found quilty through 
the victims testimony that he stabbed her and 
that she was not in the process of trying to 
end her life. The right of confrontation is 
most critical in a situation such as this. 
Two conflicting stories are told with little 
or no corroborative evidence available. The 
jury must decide whom to believe. It is 
vitally important that the witness be present 
and subject to cross-examination in the 
presence of the jury." 
gase suRga^at Pg.64 
Third, the record contained sufficient indication that the 
witness, McPerrson, was a transient and not in a position, 
financially, to assure the state that she could be present for 
the trial. 
"Ms. McPerrson's life style and nomadic habits 
make it clear that she possessed the potential 
to disappear or refuse to appear for trial. 
The prosecutor was aware of the distance the 
victim would have to travel to be present. 
Her financial condition evidenced a distinct 
lack of funds with which to travel. On 
balance, the prosecutor should have been wary 
of this witness despite her telephone 
assurances." 
Case, supra at Pg.64 
Fourth, there was an indication, from the record, that the 
tape of the testimony of witness McPerrson was played again in 
the jury room. The Court noted, "if this tape was taken into the 
jury room and was played, there is an additional erroneous 
deprivation of the right of confrontation and an over reliance on 
the testimony by the jury." Caggjr. supra at Pg.64. 
On these four basis the Court of Appeals determined that, 
although the prosecutor acted in good faith, his efforts to 
secure the witness were not reasonable and consequently the 
finding of unavailability was erroneous. 
The reasonableness of the prosecutor's actions, in any given 
case, must be viewed under those particular circumstances. The 
Court of Appeals judged this matter in light of the Court's 
decision in CkaBffi&n and applied the principles and test as 
articulated therein. 
THERE IS NO BASIS TO REVIEW THE COURT'S DECISION REGARDING 
THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE ISSUE. 
In connection with defendant's arrest at his motel room, the 
police conducted a search and obtained evidence which was 
subsequently introduced at trial. On appeal, the issue was 
raised that the search was improperly conducted and consequently 
the evidence obtained therefrom should have been surpressed. 
The Court of Appeals, having determined that the matter 
should be remanded for trial, decided the issue of supression as 
guidance for the trial court. In relation to this Court's 
decision in gfcate_v.._Haj:rig, 671 P2nd 175 (Utah 1983) the Court 
reasoned that the evidence should have been surpressed because no 
exigent circumstances were present that allowed the police to 
search the motel room without a search warrant. 
The basis for this opinion was firmly grounded on principles 
concerning the need for search warrants before the police could 
have entered the motel room. Respondent does not appear to 
dispute those facts or even the logical basis upon which they 
were applied to the law. If this Court determines to review the 
unavailable witness question, then the further determination 
would need to be made as to whether the improper search, 
independant of that issue would mandate a reversal and a new 
trial. 
The Court of Appeals determined that a new trial was 
required because of the unavailable witness issue. But in light 
of their decision regarding the search and seizure questionf a 
new trial may be also appropriate. 
Because the Utah Court of Appeals properly applied the 
principles and tests of Sfcatg. v._Chapman, and there is no issue 
regarding the search of the motel roomf the State's Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this 7 day of ^^^}^Z^^9 1987. 
>pondent 
Metropolitan Law Building 
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